On Duties

Atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati de causis pluribus. Ducuntur enim aut benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine aut dignitatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut metu, ne vi parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis promissisque[184] capti aut postremo, ut saepe in nostra re publica videmus, mercede conducti.

[183] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

[184] _promissisque_ L c, Edd.; _promissionisque_ B H a b; _promissionibusque_ alii.

*19* VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the ability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say a few words by way of preface.

Who fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal and for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to the wished for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to destruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual calamities, arising, first, from inanimate nature--hurricanes, storms, shipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild beasts--kicks, bites, and attacks. But these, as I have said, are comparatively rare. *20* But think, on the one side, of the destruction of armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the loss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil and military honours, and the victories;--though all these contain an element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good or for ill, without the influence and the co-operation of our fellow-men.

With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to explain how we can win the affectionate co-operation of our fellows and enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly prolonged, let the length be compared with the importance of the object in view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short.

#How men are led to promote another's interests.#

*21* Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon a fellow-man to raise his estate or his dignity, it may be from any one of several motives: (1) it may be out of good-will, when for some reason they are fond of him; (2) it may be from esteem, if they look up to his worth and think him deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can have; (3) they may have confidence in him and think that they are thus acting for their own interests; or (4) they may fear his power; (5) they may, on the contrary, hope for some favour--as, for example, when princes or demagogues bestow gifts of money; or, finally, (6) they may be moved by the promise of payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the meanest and most sordid motive of all, both for those who are swayed by it and for those who venture to resort to it. *22* For things are in a bad way, when that which should be obtained by merit is attempted by money. But since recourse to this kind of support is sometimes indispensable, I shall explain how it should be employed; but first I shall discuss those qualities which are more closely allied to merit.

Now, it is by various motives that people are led to submit to another's authority and power: they may be influenced (1) by good-will; (2) by gratitude for generous favours conferred upon them; (3) by the eminence of that other's social position or by the hope that their submission will turn to their own account; (4) by fear that they may be compelled perforce to submit; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of gifts of money and by liberal promises; or, finally, (6) they may be bribed with money, as we have frequently seen in our own country.

*23* VII. Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nec alienius quam timeri. Praeclare enim Ennius:

Quém metuunt, odérunt; quem quisque ódit, periisse éxpetit.

Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa pertulit civitas ac paret cum maxime mortuo,[185] interitus declarat, quantum odium hominum valeat[186] ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes exitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem interitum effugit; malus enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque benivolentia fidelis vel ad perpetuitatem.

*24* Sed iis, qui vi oppressos imperio coërcent, sit sane adhibenda saevitia, ut eris[187] in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt; qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt, ut metuantur, iis[188] nihil potest esse dementius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus, quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis quam retentae. Quod igitur latissime patet neque ad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam ad opes et potentiam valet plurimum, id amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime quae volemus, et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur.

Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. *25* Quid enim censemus superiorem illum Dionysium quo cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente carbone sibi adurebat capillum? quid Alexandrum Pheraeum quo animo vixisse arbitramur? qui, ut scriptum legimus, cum uxorem Theben admodum diligeret, tamen ad eam ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum, et eum quidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis, destricto gladio iubebat anteire praemittebatque de stipatoribus suis, qui scrutarentur arculas muliebres et, ne quod in vestimentis telum occultaretur, exquirerent. O miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret quam coniugem! Nec eum fefellit; ab ea est enim ipsa propter pelicatus suspicionem interfectus.

Nec vero ulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse diuturna. *26* Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata crudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit, ut is, quem modo dixi, Alexander, non a paucis, ut hic noster, sed in quem universa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.

Quid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt? Quid? Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes fere socii deseruerunt spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae calamitatis?

[185] _ac paret cum maxime mortuo_, Halm, Müller, Heine; _paretque cum maxime mortuo_ c^1, Bt.; _paretque, c. m. m._ L; _apparet, cuius maxime mortui_ b; _apparet cuius maxime portui_ B H a.

[187] _ut eris_ Baiter; _ut eriis_ B; _uteris_ L; _utere hiis_ H; _utere iis_ b; _utere his_ a; _utantur eis_ c.

[188] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H L a; _hijs_ c; _hiis_ b.

*23* VII. But of all motives, none is better adapted to secure influence and hold it fast than love; nothing is more foreign to that end than fear. For Ennius says admirably:

"Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, one hopes to see him dead."

And we recently discovered, if it was not known before, that no amount of power can withstand the hatred of the many. #Hatred of tyranny.# The death of this tyrant,[AK] whose yoke the state endured under the constraint of armed force and whom it still obeys more humbly than ever, though he is dead, illustrates the deadly effects of popular hatred; and the same lesson is taught by the similar fate of all other despots, of whom practically no one has ever escaped such a death. For fear is but a poor safeguard of lasting power; while affection, on the other hand, may be trusted to keep it safe for ever.

*24* But those who keep subjects in check by force would of course have to employ severity--masters, for example, toward their servants, when these cannot be held in control in any other way. But those who in a free state deliberately put themselves in a position to be feared are the maddest of the mad. For let the laws be never so much overborne by some one individual's power, let the spirit of freedom be never so intimidated, still sooner or later they assert themselves either through unvoiced public sentiment, or through secret ballots disposing of some high office of state. Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with keener fangs than freedom never endangered. Let us, then, embrace this policy, which appeals to every heart and is the strongest support not only of security but also of influence and power--namely, to banish fear and cleave to love. And thus we shall most easily secure success both in private and in public life.

Furthermore, those who wish to be feared must inevitably be afraid of those whom they intimidate. *25* #The wretchedness of fear.# What, for instance, shall we think of the elder Dionysius? With what tormenting fears he used to be racked! For through fear of the barber's razor he used to have his hair singed off with a glowing coal. In what state of mind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae lived? We read in history that he dearly loved his wife Thebe; and yet, whenever he went from the banquet hall to her in her chamber, he used to order a barbarian--one, too, tattooed like a Thracian, as the records state--to go before him with a drawn sword; and he used to send ahead some of his bodyguard to pry into the lady's caskets and to search and see whether some weapon were not concealed in her wardrobe. Unhappy man! To think a barbarian, a branded slave, more faithful than his own wife! Nor was he mistaken. For he was murdered by her own hand, because she suspected him of infidelity.

And indeed no power is strong enough to be lasting, if it labours under the weight of fear. *26* Witness Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious beyond that of all others. He was slain, not treacherously (like that Alexander whom I named but now), not by a few conspirators (like that tyrant of ours), but the whole population of Agrigentum rose against him with one accord.

Again, did not the Macedonians abandon Demetrius and march over as one man to Pyrrhus? And again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy tyrannically, did not practically all the allies desert them and view their disaster at Leuctra, as idle spectators?

VIII. Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor. Verum tamen, quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et refugium senatus, *27* nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent; *(27)* itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.

Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum est enim videri quicquam in socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria; est enim ausus dicere, hasta posita cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium et certe civium, "praedam se suam vendere." Secutus est, qui in causa impia, victoria etiam foediore non singulorum civium bona publicaret, sed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure comprehenderet.

*28* Itaque vexatis ac perditis exteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi imperii portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus et ex ea urbe triumphari, sine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis bellis triumpharunt. Multa praeterea commemorarem nefaria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol vidisset indignius. Iure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multorum impunita scelera tulissemus, numquam ad unum tanta pervenisset licentia; a quo quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit hereditas. *29* Nec vero umquam bellorum civilium semen et causa deerit, dum homines perditi hastam illam cruentam et meminerint et sperabunt; quam P.[189] Sulla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto tricesimo anno post a sceleratiore hasta non recessit; alter autem, qui in illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus. Ex quo debet intellegi talibus praemiis propositis numquam defutura bella civilia.

Itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema scelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus. Atque in has clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum), dum metui quam cari esse et diligi malumus. Quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere potuerunt, quid debent putare singuli? Quod cum perspicuum sit, benivolentiae vim esse magnam, metus imbecillam sequitur, ut disseramus, quibus rebus facillime possimus eam, quam volumus, adipisci cum honore et fide caritatem.

*30* Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuiusque vitam institutam accommodandum est, a multisne opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi. Certum igitur hoc sit, idque et primum et maxime necessarium, familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum et nostra mirantium; haec enim una[190] res prorsus, ut non multum differat inter summos et mediocris viros, aeque[191] utrisque est propemodum comparanda.

*31* Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas.

[190] _enim una_ Baiter; _enim est una_ MSS.

#The old Republic and the new despotism.#

VIII. I prefer in this connection to draw my illustrations from foreign history rather than from our own. Let me add, however, that as long as the empire of the Roman People maintained itself by acts of service, not of oppression, wars were waged in the interest of our allies or to safeguard our supremacy; the end of our wars was marked by acts of clemency or by only a necessary degree of severity; the senate was a haven of refuge for kings, tribes, and nations; *27* and the highest ambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and allies with justice and honour. *(27)* And so our government could be called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion.

This policy and practice we had begun gradually to modify even before Sulla's time; but since his victory we have departed from it altogether. For the time had gone by when any oppression of the allies could appear wrong, seeing that atrocities so outrageous were committed against Roman citizens. In Sulla's case, therefore, an unrighteous victory disgraced a righteous cause. For when he had planted his spear[AL] and was selling under the hammer in the forum the property of men who were patriots and men of wealth and, at least, Roman citizens, he had the effrontery to announce that "he was selling his spoils." After him came one who, in an unholy cause, made an even more shameful use of victory; for he did not stop at confiscating the property of individual citizens, but actually embraced whole provinces and countries in one common ban of ruin.

*28* And so, when foreign nations had been oppressed and ruined, we have seen a model of Marseilles carried in a triumphal procession, to serve as proof to the world that the supremacy of the people had been forfeited; and that triumph we saw celebrated over a city without whose help our generals have never gained a triumph for their wars beyond the Alps. I might mention many other outrages against our allies, if the sun had ever beheld anything more infamous than this particular one. #The wages of the sin of Rome.# Justly, therefore, are we being punished. For if we had not allowed the crimes of many to go unpunished, so great licence would never have centred in one individual. His estate descended by inheritance to but a few individuals, his ambitions to many scoundrels. *29* And never will the seed and occasion of civil war be wanting, so long as villains remember that blood-stained spear and hope to see another. As Publius Sulla wielded that spear, when his kinsman was dictator, so again thirty-six years later he did not shrink from a still more criminal spear. And still another Sulla, who was a mere clerk under the former dictatorship, was under the later one a city quaestor. From this, one would realize that, if such rewards are offered, civil wars will never cease to be.

And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing--and even they wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes--but our republic we have lost for ever. But to return to my subject: it is while we have preferred to be the object of fear rather than of love and affection, that all these misfortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution could overtake the Roman People for their injustice and tyranny, what ought private individuals to expect? And since it is manifest that the power of good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it remains for us to discuss by what means we can most readily win the affection, linked with honour and confidence, which we desire.

*30* But we do not all feel this need to the same extent; for it must be determined in conformity with each individual's vocation in life whether it is essential for him to have the affection of many or whether the love of a few will suffice. Let this then be settled as the first and absolute essential--that we have the devotion of friends, affectionate and loving, who value our worth. For in just this one point there is but little difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and friendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both.

*31* All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour, fame, and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the acquisition of friends.

[AL] The Romans were accustomed to set up a spear as a sign of an auction-sale--a symbol derived from the sale of booty taken in war.

IX. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum.

Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere possimus.

*32* Ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta videamus; quae quidem capitur beneficiis maxime, secundo autem loco voluntate benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non suppetit; vehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama et opinione liberalitatis, beneficentiae, iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum, quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem. Etenim illud ipsum, quod honestum decorumque dicimus, quia per se nobis placet animosque omnium natura et specie sua commovet maximeque quasi perlucet ex iis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus, idcirco illos, in quibus eas virtutes esse remur, a natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hae quidem causae diligendi gravissimae; possunt enim praeterea non nullae esse leviores.

*33* Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest, si existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis fidem habemus, quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum sit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem homines existimant veramque prudentiam. Iustis autem et fidis[192] hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, ut nulla sit in iis[193] fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. Itaque his salutem nostram, his fortunas, his liberos rectissime committi arbitramur.

*34* Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia plus pollet, quippe cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia nihil valet ad faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et callidior, hoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem intellegentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam fidem virium; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia.

[192] _et fidis_ MSS.; del. Facciolati, Pearce; [_et fidis_] Bt., Ed.

IX. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled "Laelius." #The attainment of glory.# Let us now take up the discussion of Glory, although I have published two books[AM] on that subject also. Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in the conduct of more important business.

The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. #How to gain popularity:# But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once.

*32* But of the three above-named requisites, let us look first at good-will and the rules for securing it. Good-will is won principally through kind services[AN]; next to that, it is elicited by the will to do a kind service, even though nothing happen to come of it. Then, too, the love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man's mere name and reputation for generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all those virtues that belong to gentleness of character and affability of manner. And because that very quality which we term moral goodness and propriety is pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts both by its inward essence and its outward aspect and shines forth with most lustre through those virtues named above, we are, therefore, compelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we believe those virtues to reside. Now these are only the most powerful motives to love--not all of them; there may be some minor ones besides.

*33* Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two conditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we think have more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a crisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision according to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the world accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in men who are just and true--that is, good men--on the definite assumption that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or wrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care.

*34* Of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to inspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has considerable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all.

[AM] Now lost, though they were still known to Petrarch.

[AN] Cicero means by "kind services" the services of the lawyer; he was forbidden by law to accept a fee; his services, if he contributed them, were "acts of kindness."

*35* X. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos constet a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes habere virtutes, nunc ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem prudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad opinionem communem omnis accommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur, ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus; popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur[194] de opinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad propositum revertamur.

*36* Erat igitur ex iis[195] tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis[196] digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,[197] sed de iis[198] male existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii,[199] qui "nec sibi nec alteri," ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est.

*37* Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae, maioris partis animos[200] a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors, divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis?

[194] _loquimur_ B; _loquamur_ H a b; _loquemur_ c.

[195] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H; _hijs_ c; not in a b.

[196] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

[197] _haud contemnunt quidem_ b, Bt.^2; _contemnunt quidem nautiquam_ B H a p, Bt.^1, Heine; _contemnunt quidem nequaquam_ c; _non contemnunt quidem_ Madvig, Müller.

[198] _iis_ B, Edd.; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.

[199] _ii_ B b; _hii_ H; _hi_ a; _hij_, c. So § 37.

[200] _maioris partis animos_ c, Edd.; _maiores partis animi_ B; _maiores partes animi_ H a b.

*35* X. But I am afraid some one may wonder why I am now separating the virtues--as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject.

*36* The third, then, of the three conditions I named as essential to glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they consider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy, and indifferent.

*37* On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are thought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure. Life and death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when men, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward circumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and virtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to itself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue?

*38* XI. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et maxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica quaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea, quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum, qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni spectatum arbitrantur.

Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriam, omnia iustitia conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem causam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.

*39* Ac mea quidem sententia omnis ratio atque institutio vitae adiumenta hominum desiderat, in primisque ut habeat, quibuscum possit familiares conferre sermones; quod est difficile, nisi speciem prae te boni viri feras. Ergo etiam solitario homini atque in agro vitam agenti opinio iustitiae necessaria est, eoque etiam magis, quod, eam si non habebunt, [iniusti habebuntur,][201] nullis praesidiis saepti multis afficientur iniuriis. *40* #I, 96# Atque iis[202] etiam, qui vendunt emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia ad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum, ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt; quem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit ferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet.

Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta re publica fore putamus?

[201] _iniusti habebuntur_ B H b; bracketed by Facciolati, Edd.

[202] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b, not in c.

*38* XI. As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous virtue--and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him tried as by fire.

Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same reason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried away.

*39* Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and vocation in life calls for human co-operation--first and above all, in order that one may have friends with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is not easy, unless one is looked upon as a good man. So, even to a man who shuns society and to one who spends his life in the country a reputation for justice is essential--even more so than to others; for they who do not have it [but are considered unjust] will have no defence to protect them and so will be the victims of many kinds of wrong. *40* So also to buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for the conduct of business. #Honour among thieves.# Its importance is so great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus, acquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually defied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius--the one surnamed "the Wise"--in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms, and so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an easy conquest.

Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and courts?

*41* XII. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops[203] multitudo ab iis, qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem; qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum infimis[204] pari iure retinebat.[205] Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa, quae regum. *42* Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile; neque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro consequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur.

Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem etiam prudentes haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non esset), tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae.

Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandae, quae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nec solum necessarios, sed etiam liberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et collocanda ratione est. *43* #Xen. Mem. II, 6, 39# Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et inani ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nec simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum.

[203] _inops_ inferior MSS., Edd.; _in otio_ (i.e. "at will") B H a b p; _inicio_ (= _initio_) c.

[204] _infimis_ c, Edd.; _infirmis_ B a b; _infirmos_ H.

[205] _retinebat_ c, Edd.; _pertinebat_ B H a p; _pertinebant_ b.

*41* XII. Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes, as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy justice. For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was conspicuous for his virtue; and as he shielded the weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. *42* For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law. For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice.

This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is, therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement of personal honour and glory.

But as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of investing it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring expenses--both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of life--so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to account. *43* #The way to glory is Justice.# And yet, as Socrates used to express it so admirably, "the nearest way to glory--a short-cut, as it were--is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show, by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but for brevity's sake, I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus, Publius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome shall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they lived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose murder was justifiable.

XIII. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam[206] volet, iustitiae fungatur officiis. #I, 20-41# Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore.

[206] _veram gloriam_ Edd.; _veram iustitiae gloriam_ MSS.

XIII. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in the course of the preceding book.

*44* (XIII.) Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen quaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et, tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec factum. *45* Quorum autem prima aetas propter humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii,[207] simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere: quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non invidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur.

Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae [alteri][208] praefecisset, magnam laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re publica cecidit.

Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto; quam ob rem pergamus ad ea, quae restant.

*46* Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res, quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur, gratiores sunt quam illae, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a modestia cum[209] pietate in parentes, in suos benivolentia. Facillime autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt; quibuscum si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes, quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. *47* P. Rutili adulescentiam ad opinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci commendavit domus. Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adulescens, non aliunde mutuatus est, sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione nobili et gloriosa, et, qua[210] aetate qui exercentur, laude affici solent, ut de Demosthene accepimus, ea aetate L. Crassus ostendit id se in foro optime iam facere, quod etiam tum poterat domi cum laude meditari.

[207] _ii_ B, Edd.; _hi_ H; _iis_ b; _hij_ c; _his_ a.

[210] _et, qua_ Manutius, Edd.; _ex qua_ MSS.

*44* (XIII.) But although the very essence of the problem is that we actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being what we are. For if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be kept a secret. *45* Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure origin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their eyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This they will do with the better heart, because that time of life is accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition.

Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among our forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare was almost continuous then. The period of your own youth, however, has coincided with that war in which the one side was too prolific in crime, the other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you in command of a cavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and of the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for endurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. But that credit accorded to you came to nothing along with the fall of the republic.

The subject of this discussion, however, is not your personal history, but the general theme. Let us, therefore, proceed to the sequel.

*46* As, then, in everything else brain-work is far more important than mere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through intellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those which we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation, then, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. #(3) by association with the great,# Next to that, young men win recognition most easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who are at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public affairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in the public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they have themselves selected them for imitation. *47* His frequent visits to the home of Publius Mucius assisted young Publius Rutilius to gain a reputation for integrity of character and for ability as a jurisconsult. Not so, however, Lucius Crassus; for though he was a mere boy, he looked to no one else for assistance, but by his own unaided ability he won for himself in that brilliant and famous prosecution[AO] a splendid reputation as an orator. And at an age when young men are accustomed with their school exercises to win applause as students of oratory, this Roman Demosthenes, Lucius Crassus, was already proving himself in the law-courts a master of the art which he might even then have been studying at home with credit to himself.

[AO] At the age of 21 Crassus conducted the case against Gaius Papirius Carbo, a former supporter of the Gracchi. The prosecution was so ably conducted that Carbo committed suicide to escape certain condemnation.

*48* XIV. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo sit, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio [orationis][211] maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam eloquentiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. Exstant epistulae et Philippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus); quibus praecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam alliciant militesque blande appellando [sermone][212] deliniant. Quae autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam excitat [gloriam][213]; magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque dicentis; quem qui audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam ceteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas, nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adulescente.

*49* Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent, multique in nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud populum[214] et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est admiratio in iudiciis.

Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et ex defensione constat; quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persaepe est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adulescens M. Antonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam accusatio illustravit, cum seditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. *50* Sed hoc quidem non est saepe faciendum nec umquam nisi aut rei publicae causa, ut ii, quos ante dixi, aut ulciscendi, ut duo Luculli, aut patrocinii, ut nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis in Albucio Iulius. In accusando etiam M'. Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est. Semel igitur aut non saepe certe. Sin erit, cui faciendum sit saepius, rei publicae tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos ulcisci saepius non est reprehendendum; modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis vel potius vix hominis videtur periculum capitis inferre multis. Id cum periculosum ipsi est, tum etiam sordidum ad famam, committere, ut accusator nominere; quod contigit M. Bruto summo genere nato, illius filio, qui iuris civilis in primis peritus fuit.

*51* Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quem umquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri nullo pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem perniciemque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium[215] impiumque, defendere; vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. Iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non numquam veri simile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urguerique videatur, ut nos et saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus quae, ut scis, exstat oratio.

[211] _orationis_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Fleckeisen, Bt.^2, Müller, Heine.

[212] _blande appellando sermone_ a c, Edd.; _blando appellando sermone_ B H b; _blande appellando_ Gulielmus (with three inferior MSS.), Bt., Heine; [_sermone_] Ed.

[213] _excitat gloriam_ MSS.; _excitat_ [_gloriam_] Ed.; _excitat_ Lange.

[214] _et apud populum_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

[215] _modo ne nefarium_ L c, Edd.; _modo nefarium_ Nonius; _et nefarium_ B H a b.

*48* XIV. But as the classification of discourse is a twofold one--conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other--there can be no doubt that of the two this debating-power (for that is what we mean by eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet, it is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in conversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for instance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent and judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers think him understanding and wise beyond all others. And if his speech have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man.